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______________ 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Robert Bautista, a legal permanent resident, 
was ordered removed from the United States by an 
immigration judge (“IJ”).  The IJ found him removable 
because he is inadmissible under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act  (“INA”) as an alien 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  The IJ also found him ineligible for 
cancellation of removal under § 240A(a) of the INA because 
his New York conviction for attempted arson constituted an 
aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  Bautista appealed to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed 
his appeal.  The BIA agreed that the arson conviction fell 
within the relevant definition of an aggravated felony under § 
101(a)(43) of the INA.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).   
 
Bautista filed a timely petition for review in this Court.  
We will grant the petition because the New York attempted 
arson conviction is not an aggravated felony in respect to 
collateral immigration consequences under the INA.  
Applying the categorical approach, as we must, the New York 
statute under which Bautista was convicted does not match 
the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the corresponding federal 
statute under the INA.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i).  A 
conviction under that New York arson statute cannot qualify 
as an aggravated felony because it lacks the jurisdictional 
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element of § 844(i), which the Supreme Court has found to be 
a critical and substantive element of that arson offense.  We 
vacate the BIA ruling and remand to the BIA for further 
consideration in light of this opinion. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Bautista is a citizen of the Dominican Republic, where 
he was born in 1974.  He was admitted to the United States as 
a legal permanent resident in 1984 and attended school in the 
Bronx.  In 1996, he married Yenny Bautista, also a legal 
permanent resident.  They have three minor children, all of 
whom are United States citizens.  Bautista’s mother is also a 
United States citizen.  Bautista owns and operates an 
automobile repair business in Easton, Pennsylvania, with 
seven employees.   
 
Bautista has two criminal convictions.  In 2001, he was 
charged in New Jersey with uttering a forged instrument, in 
violation of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Conduct, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-1a(3).  He pled guilty to that crime in 
2004 and received a sentence of one year of probation.  In 
2003, after trial in the Bronx, New York, he was convicted of 
attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of New York 
Penal Law §§ 110 and 150.10.  He was sentenced to five 
years of probation.  
 
In 2009, while returning from a trip to the Dominican 
Republic, Bautista was stopped and detained by Customs and 
Border Patrol officials at John F. Kennedy International 
Airport.  He was released upon Deferred Inspection status, 
pending a secondary inspection, and, the following spring, the 
Department of Homeland Security instituted removal 
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proceedings against him based on his inadmissibility under 
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the INA as an alien convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  At a hearing before the IJ, Bautista 
admitted that he was convicted of attempted arson, and the IJ 
determined that he was inadmissible.   
 
At an immigration hearing on April 8, 2010, Bautista 
applied for cancellation of removal but the Government 
moved to pretermit the application on the ground that his 
attempted arson conviction counts as an aggravated felony 
under § 101(a)(43)(E) of the INA, making him ineligible for 
cancellation under § 240A(a)(3) of the INA.  Bautista also 
applied for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the 
INA, which the Government also moved to pretermit based 
on the attempted arson conviction.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  The 
IJ initially denied the Government’s motions but granted 
them after the Government filed motions for reconsideration.  
On February 8, 2011, the IJ ordered Bautista removed. 
 
Bautista appealed only the cancellation of removal 
issue to the BIA.  He argued that his attempted arson 
conviction was not an aggravated felony described in 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) of the INA, which lists arson offenses 
under federal law.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i).  The 
penultimate sentence of § 101(a)(43) explains that an 
aggravated felony  is “an offense described in this paragraph 
whether in violation of Federal or State law.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43).  Bautista argued that, because the New York 
statute under which he was convicted does not require that the 
object of the arson be used in interstate commerce, as the 
corresponding federal statute does, his New York conviction 
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was not one “described in” the aggravated felony definition of 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i).   
 
On October 13, 2011, the BIA rejected this argument.  
Bautista asks this Court to review the BIA decision, renewing 
his argument that the absence of the federal jurisdictional 
element in the New York arson statute exempts it from the 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) definition of an aggravated felony.  For the 
following reasons, we will grant Bautista’s petition.         
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15 and we have jurisdiction to review 
the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).   
 
Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on 
the merits, we review its decision and not the decision of the 
IJ.  Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
 Because the basis for Bautista’s removal is a 
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, the REAL 
ID Act limits our jurisdiction to “constitutional claims or 
questions of law”.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Catwell v. 
Attorney Gen. of U.S., 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(noting limited jurisdiction to review removal orders based on 
aggravated felony convictions).  We review legal 
determinations made by the BIA de novo, subject to the 
principles of deference articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  
See Catwell, 623 F.3d at 205.   
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
In reviewing an agency decision, we must give 
deference to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute 
unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly 
expressed congressional intent.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.  
A statute cannot be deemed ambiguous, however, until the 
court exhausts the aid of “traditional tools of statutory 
construction.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.  Here,  we find 
that the BIA’s construction with respect to the classification 
of state convictions as aggravated felonies under 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is inconsistent with Congress’s expressed 
intent. 
 
Our dissenting colleague observes that the statute is “at 
best ambiguous” by the virtue of our disagreement over the 
construction of the statute.  While we sympathize with this 
view, not every difficult question of statutory  construction 
amounts to a statutory gap for a federal agency to fill.  The 
Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence is replete with 
instances where disagreements in the lower courts did not 
prevent the Court from discerning Congressional intent from 
complex statutory provisions.  See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) 
(holding that Congress had expressed an intention on the 
precise question of whether the FDA could regulate tobacco 
notwithstanding numerous cases in which the courts of appeal 
had found ambiguity in closely related statutory language); 
N.L.R.B. v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 
580 (1994) (holding that “the Board’s test is inconsistent with 
both the statutory language and th[e] Court’s precedents”).  
To conclude otherwise would be to find that every time there 
is a disagreement about statutory construction, we accord 
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deference to agencies.  This is not what Chevron instructs us 
to do.1   
 
In light of our forthcoming discussion, we find here 
that Congress has spoken with sufficient clarity to make 
deference inappropriate.   
 
A. Statutory Construction of § 101(a)(43) of the INA 
 
Bautista applied for cancellation of removal under the 
INA, which is only available to an alien who “has not been 
convicted of any aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  An 
“aggravated felony” is defined by § 101(a)(43) of the INA, 
which enumerates a number of offenses that qualify as 
aggravated felonies.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  Primarily, 
                                              
1 Consider Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).  In that case, the Supreme 
Court was tasked with deciding whether the plain meaning of 
the statutory language indicated a congressional intent that 
the proof standards under §§ 208(a) and 243(h) of the INA 
should differ.  The Court engaged in an extensive 
investigation into the structure and the legislative history of 
the statute and concluded that Congress did not intend the two 
standards to be identical.  This conclusion was reached 
notwithstanding that dissenting Justices found the statute to 
be “far more ambiguous than the Court [did].” 480 U.S. at 
459 (Powell, J., dissenting).  In doing so, the Cardoza-
Fonseca Court pronounced that “[t]he question whether 
Congress intended the [proof standards under §§ 208(a) and 
243(h) of the INA] to be identical is a pure question of 
statutory construction for the courts to decide.”  Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. 
9 
 
interpretation of § 101(a)(43) revolves around three features 
of the statute’s structure: its references to a category of 
aggravated felonies with generic offenses or federal statutes, 
its usage of “described in” or “defined in” when utilizing 
federal statutes, and its penultimate sentence.2 
 
Due to the wide structural and linguistic variation 
among state statutes that criminalize the same type of 
conduct, § 101(a)(43) references some aggravated felonies 
with their generic offense, such as “murder” or “theft”, while 
it references other aggravated felonies with a specific federal 
criminal statute, such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (for possession 
of a weapon by a felon) or 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (for arson).  
When referencing a specific federal statute, the INA does so 
in two ways: It either deems that an aggravated felony is an 
offense “described in” a federal statute or that an aggravated 
felony includes criminal conduct “defined in” a federal 
statute.  For example, § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) covers any offense 
“described in” 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).   
 
We must assume that Congress intended some 
meaning through its use of “described in” versus “defined in” 
and this intention can be inferred by observing the pattern of 
§ 101(a)(43) and the federal statutes that it references.  See 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
                                              
2 We refer to a “generic” offense as an offense described by 
its “commonly understood” elements, such as “burglary” or 
“theft”, rather than by the elements of a particular federal or 
state statute.  Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 
2281 (2013); see Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 37 (2013). 
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generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Section 
101(a)(43) uses “defined in” when the reference to a federal 
statute is preceded by criminal conduct terms, such as “illicit 
trafficking of drugs” or “crime of violence”, which Congress 
has chosen to define by reference to a federal statute.  In these 
“defined in” subsections of § 101(a)(43), the state conviction 
need not be punishable under that federal statute but need 
only include the listed criminal conduct, as it is “defined” by 
the federal statute.  This elicits a sensible interpretation of 
legislative intent when observing that the federal statutes 
following the “defined in” phrasing are the definitional 
sections of criminal statutes or sections that explicitly define 
the listed criminal conduct.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) 
(referencing 21 U.S.C. § 802, a “Definitions” section, which 
defines “controlled substance”); id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 
924, which defines “drug trafficking crime” in § 924(c)(2)); 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 921, a 
“Definitions” section, which defines “destructive devices”); 
id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 841(c), another “Definitions” 
section, which defines “explosive materials”); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 16, entitled “Crime 
of violence defined”, which defines “crime of violence”).   
 
In contrast, Congress employs “described in” to 
classify a state conviction as an aggravated felony when an 
offense would be punishable under a federal statute because 
the conduct or state statute of the conviction encompasses the 
same elements as a federal statute.  These federal statutes are 
not definitional but, rather, describe a specific type of offense.  
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E), (H)-(J), (L).  In drafting 
§ 101(a)(43), Congress often grouped several federal criminal 
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statutes of like kind together in order to achieve any desired 
breadth in scope, which would serve to describe the targeted 
offenses under a more generic category.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(E)(i) (grouping 18 U.S.C. §§ 842(h), (i), 844(d)-
(i) together as crimes “relating to explosive materials 
offenses”). 
 
Lastly, § 101(a)(43) includes a penultimate sentence 
that clarifies the relationship of state convictions to the 
overall statutory scheme of § 101(a)(43).  The penultimate 
sentence reads as follows: 
 
The term [aggravated felony] applies to an 
offense described in this paragraph whether in 
violation of Federal or State law and applies to 
such an offense in violation of the law of a 
foreign country for which the term of 
imprisonment was completed within the 
previous 15 years.   
 
Id. (emphasis added).  By adding this sentence, Congress 
expressed its intention that both state and federal offenses 
may serve as aggravated felonies under § 101(a)(43).  As the 
Supreme Court explained, the penultimate sentence “has two 
perfectly straightforward jobs to do: it provides that a generic 
description . . . covers either [a state or federal conviction], 
and it confirms that a state offense whose elements include 
the elements of a felony punishable under the [referenced 
federal statute] is an aggravated felony.”  Lopez v. Gonzalez, 
549 U.S. 47, 57 (2006). 
 
Pertinent to our inquiry, § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) lists as 
aggravated felonies the offenses described in “section 842(h) 
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or (i) of Title 18, or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of 
that title (relating to explosive materials offenses).”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(E)(i).  Of those offenses, the one that most 
closely corresponds to Bautista’s conviction is 18 U.S.C. § 
844(i).  That statute states as follows: 
 
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or 
attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire 
or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other 
real or personal property used in interstate or 
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce shall be 
imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not 
more than 20 years, fined under this title, or 
both. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 
 Bautista was convicted of attempted arson in the third 
degree, in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 110 and 
150.10.  Section 150.10 states that “[a] person is guilty of 
arson in the third degree when he intentionally damages a 
building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an 
explosion.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 150.10.  Section 110 is the 
general attempt provision.  N.Y. Penal Law § 110.  Bautista 
does not dispute that the New York statute and the federal 
statute contain three identical, substantive elements: 1) 
damaging a building or vehicle, 2) intentionally, 3) by using 
fire or explosives.  The Government does not dispute that the 
jurisdictional element of § 844(i), requiring that the object of 
arson be “used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any 
activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce,” is not 
contained in the New York statute.  What Bautista urges is 
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that the jurisdictional element is also a substantive element 
and, consequently, that his conviction cannot qualify as an 
aggravated felony.   
 
Based on the opinions of several of our sister circuits, 
the Government argues that this jurisdictional element is not 
substantive and, therefore, is not an element describing an 
offense under § 844(i).  See Nieto Hernandez v. Holder, 592 
F.3d 681, 685-86 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing § 922(g)(1) 
under § 101(a)(43)(E)(ii)); Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 
518 F.3d 497, 501-03 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. 
Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(same); see also Spacek v. Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 538-39 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (following the Ninth, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits in 
analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 1962 under § 101(a)(43)(J)). 
 
While Bautista’s argument has been rejected by 
several of our sister circuits in regard to offenses described in 
§ 922(g)(1), we find it congruous with the structure of the 
INA and Supreme Court precedent regarding § 844(i).  Cf.  
Maislin Industries v. Primary Steel, Inc., et al., 497 U.S. 116, 
131 (1990) (“Once we have determined a statute’s clear 
meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine 
of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation 
of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s 
meaning.”).  
 
B. Use of the Categorical Approach 
 
 In order to determine whether a state conviction is an 
aggravated felony within the meaning of § 101(a)(43), we 
generally compare the elements provided by the federal law 
to the conduct and state statute of conviction, as set forth by 
14 
 
the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
601 (1990).  See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-
85 (2013); Aguilar v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 692, 695 (3d Cir. 
2011).  In employing this “categorical approach”, we 
essentially assess whether the state statute and the conduct 
actually punished by the conviction amounts to a felony 
punishable under the corresponding federal statute.  
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2588 (2010) 
(explaining that the categorical approach determines whether 
“the state offense . . . is ‘punishable as a felony under federal 
law’” (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 60)); see 
Catwell, 623 F.3d at 206 n.11; Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 695.  As 
such, the purpose of the categorical approach is to sort out 
which state offenses are properly included within the 
substance of a federal statute or generic offense and which are 
not.   
 
The categorical approach is usually undertaken as a 
“formal categorical approach”, which strictly requires us to 
“look to the elements of the statutory state offense, not to the 
specific facts [of the case], reading the applicable statute to 
ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain 
conviction under the statute.”  Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 695 
(quoting Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 
2011)); Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 
2012).  In certain, limited circumstances, a “modified 
categorical approach” may be appropriate, where a state 
statute “contain[s] several different crimes, each described 
separately.”  Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684; Descamps v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284-85 (2013) (limiting the 
modified categorical approach to statutes that create 
alternative crimes by including disjunctive elements); see also 
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-01; Denis, 633 F.3d at 206.  In such a 
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case, “a court may determine which particular offense the 
noncitizen was convicted of by examining” a limited set of 
documents from the record of conviction.  Moncrieffe, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1684.  However, the modified categorical approach 
“acts not as an exception, but instead as a tool” to the 
implementation of the categorical approach, and it “retains 
the categorical approach’s basic method: comparing [the 
conviction’s] elements with the generic offense’s.”  
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285.  This approach, therefore, does 
not invite inquiry into the facts underlying the conviction.  Id. 
 
Here, we are not faced with one of those narrow 
circumstances and, so, we limit our inquiry to the formal 
categorical approach.3  The New York arson statute does not 
describe multiple crimes with alternative elements, but only 
describes a single crime with a single set of indivisible 
elements.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285. 
 
 By its design, application of the categorical approach 
depends upon the substantive nature of the offense.  For 
instance, the categorical approach for illicit drug trafficking 
under § 101(a)(43)(B) takes into account different 
                                              
3 In Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009), the Supreme 
Court broke from the categorical approach and engaged in a 
“circumstance-specific approach”.  We do not venture down 
such a path since the Supreme Court limited such an approach 
to subsections of § 101(a)(43) that include “in which” 
requirements written directly into the INA by Congress.  Id. 
at 38-40.  In the subsection at issue here, § 101(a)(43)(E)(i), 
the jurisdictional element is not written directly into the INA 
by Congress but resides as an element in the enumerated 
federal criminal statutes.  See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1691. 
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considerations than the categorical approach for possession of 
a firearm by a felon under § 101(a)(43)(E)(ii); under § 
101(a)(43)(B), it matters whether the state statute includes a 
trafficking element, whether the state statute criminalizes a 
sufficiently large quantity of drugs, and whether remuneration 
is required.  See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685-86; see, e.g., 
Catwell, 623 F.3d at 206-07.  Or, with crimes of violence 
under § 101(a)(43)(F), it matters whether the state conviction 
punishes the proper level of mens rea.  See, e.g., Aguilar, 663 
F.3d at 695-700.  For this reason, the rationale that our sister 
circuits have developed in applying the categorical approach 
to § 922(g)(1) under § 101(a)(43)(E)(ii) has limited import to 
our categorical approach to § 844(i) under § 101(a)(43)(E)(i).  
Thus, while both § 922(g)(1) and § 844(i) fall under the same 
subsection, § 101(a)(43)(E), they are still distinct categories 
of aggravated felonies and that distinction bears on the 
application of the subsection. 
 
In following the rationale of our sister circuits, the BIA 
removed the jurisdictional element from its categorical 
approach analysis and ruled that Bautista’s conviction was an 
aggravated felony because all the “substantive” elements of 
the New York attempted arson offense corresponded to the 
substantive elements of § 844(i).  Bautista, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
616, 619-21 (BIA 2011).  Analyzing the language of § 
101(a)(43), the BIA concluded that the penultimate sentence 
makes clear that “‘the crimes specified are aggravated 
felonies regardless of whether they fall within the jurisdiction 
of the federal government, a state, or, in certain cases, a 
foreign country.’”  Id. at 619-20 (quoting Vasquez-Muniz, 23 
I. & N. Dec. 207, 210 (BIA 2002)).  The BIA’s decision 
relied in substantial part on its previous interpretation of § 
101(a)(43)(E) in In re Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I. & N. Dec. 207 
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(BIA 2002).  In that decision, the BIA decided that conviction 
for possession of a firearm by a felon under California law 
was an offense “described in” § 922(g)(1) under § 
101(a)(43)(E)(ii) even though the California statute lacked the 
jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1).  Id. at 208.   In Vasquez-
Muniz, the BIA determined that the jurisdictional element of 
§ 922(g)(1) was not integral to the categorical approach 
analysis because the language in the penultimate sentence of 
§ 101(a)(43) confirmed that “the [state] crimes specified are 
aggravated felonies regardless of whether they fall within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government [or] a state.”  Id. at 
211.  The Vasquez-Muniz decision went on to posit that “if 
state crimes must include a federal jurisdictional element in 
order to be classified as aggravated felonies, then virtually no 
state crimes would ever be included in section 101(a)(43)(E), 
despite the statute’s language to the contrary.”  Id.  Based on 
Vasquez-Muniz, the BIA in this case reasoned that, if the 
absence of the jurisdictional element were allowed to remove 
state convictions from the aggravated felony category, state 
convictions would rarely, if ever, qualify as aggravated 
felonies.  Bautista, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 620.   
 
 The rationale of the BIA follows that of our three sister 
circuits, all of which have interpreted § 101(a)(43)(E) in the § 
922(g)(1) context.  See Nieto Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 
681, 685 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that the “interstate 
commerce element is simply an element that ensures federal 
jurisdiction” and that requiring it to be present in a state 
offense “would undermine Congress’s evident intent that 
jurisdiction be disregarded in applying” the definition of an 
aggravated felony); Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 
497, 501-03 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that, “[a]lthough not 
‘mere surplusage,’ a jurisdictional element does little more 
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than ensure that the conduct regulated in a federal criminal 
statute is within the federal government’s limited power to 
proscribe” and, therefore, finding the state offense to be an 
aggravated felony); United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 
1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the interstate 
commerce element is “‘merely a jurisdictional basis’” and, 
therefore, finding the state offense to be an aggravated 
felony).4   
 
In ascribing legislative intent to the phrasing of § 
101(a)(43)(E), our sister circuits have posited that the use of 
“described in”, which each asserts is broader than “defined 
in”, can reach conduct beyond the bare elements of the 
federal statutes to which they are tied.  See Castillo-Rivera, 
244 F.3d at 1023.  As a result, these circuits have concluded 
that Congress intended for the “described in” categories to be 
broad enough to encompass state statutes that do not include 
the jurisdictional element of the federal statute cognate.  
Because the Seventh, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits followed the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Castillo-Rivera, a discussion of 
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion suffices to examine the rationale 
of our sister circuits. 
 
 In Castillo-Rivera, an illegal reentry case involving a 
Sentencing Guidelines enhancement, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that the appellant’s state conviction did not need a 
jurisdictional element to qualify as an aggravated felony 
under § 101(a)(43)(E)(ii).  244 F.3d at 1023-24.  Based on the 
penultimate sentence of § 101(a)(43) and the deliberate use of 
                                              
4 The fourth of our sister circuits, the Eighth Circuit, applied 
the same rationale to 18 U.S.C. § 1962 under § 101(a)(43)(J).  
Spacek, 688 F.3d at 538. 
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“described in”, the Ninth Circuit presumed that Congress 
desired that the aggravated felony categories include more 
than a negligible amount of state convictions.  Id. at 1023.  
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the penultimate sentence of 
§ 101(a)(43), which emphasizes that aggravated felonies can 
be “in violation of Federal or State law,” plainly indicated 
that Congress intended for state convictions to count as 
aggravated felonies; the fact that only a minute number of 
state criminal statutes have a jurisdictional element further 
convinced the Ninth Circuit that Congress must not have 
intended for the jurisdictional element of federal statutes to 
hamper Taylor’s categorical approach.  Id. at 1023-24.  
Second, meaning was read into Congress’s decision to use 
“defined in” for some aggravated felony subcategories and 
“described in” for others.  Id. at 1023.  The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the use of “described in” was a deliberate 
choice by Congress to capture more than a handful of state 
convictions within § 101(a)(43)(E).  Lastly, relying on United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the jurisdictional element was simply a 
jurisdictional requirement detached from the substantive 
nature of the offense, included only to confer Congress with 
the authority to pass federal statutes.  Id. at 1024. 
 
We agree with our sister circuits that the penultimate 
sentence conveys Congress’s intent to qualify more than a 
negligible number of state convictions as aggravated felonies.  
We do not find, however, that the structure of § 101(a)(43)(E) 
evidences Congress’s intent to accomplish that objective 
through the use of “described in” rather than “defined in” as a 
means to always discard jurisdictional elements of federal 
felonies for the purposes of § 101(a)(43)(E).  If Congress had 
intended to exclude the jurisdictional element of all federal 
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statutes from the categorical approach analysis, it could 
simply have included a different penultimate sentence stating 
that jurisdictional elements should be ignored, as it clearly 
expressed its directives regarding specific subsections 
elsewhere in § 101(a)(43).  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(D), (M)(i) (setting monetary thresholds for these 
subsections); id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (excluding “purely political 
offense[s]” under this subsection); id. § 1101(a)(43)(J) 
(directing that an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 1084 only 
qualifies under this subsection “if it is a second or subsequent 
offense”); id. (setting imprisonment at one year or more to 
qualify under this subsection).   
 
Congress also could have defined the offenses 
embodied in the federal statutes by their generic names rather 
than by specific statutes, as it also did elsewhere in 
§ 101(a)(43).  For instance, in the case of § 844(i), it could 
have simply left the category open to all explosive materials 
offenses or at least to all acts of arson.  But it did not make 
such a generic reference: It referred to arson that included a 
sufficient relationship to interstate commerce.  We must 
assume that Congress was aware of the limits imposed by the 
Commerce Clause on the reach of the statutes it passes and 
that it restricted the breadth of § 101(a)(43)(E) with the 
substantive constraints of the included jurisdictional elements 
in mind.  See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 
U.S. 271, 279-80 (1975) (comparing Congress’s use of “in 
commerce” versus “affected commerce” to show that 
Congress is aware of its Commerce Clause power and the 
extent to which it asserts that power in drafting statutes).  In 
some circumstances, the jurisdictional element may be the 
most meaningful and differentiating element, since it is what 
distinguishes generic arson from the arson described by § 
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844(i), thereby evincing Congress’s intent in selecting § 
844(i) rather than generic arson.5   
 
C. The Jurisdictional Element of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) 
 
Unlike our sister circuits’ precedent in the § 922(g)(1) 
context, the Supreme Court has explained that the 
jurisdictional element of § 844(i) substantially narrows the 
range of arson criminalized therein.  In Jones v. United States, 
529 U.S. 848 (2000), the Supreme Court paid particular 
attention to the significance of the jurisdictional element of 
the statute.  In Jones, the petitioner had been convicted under 
§ 844(i) for tossing a Molotov cocktail into his cousin’s 
house.  The Supreme Court overturned his conviction, 
holding that the house did not satisfy the jurisdictional 
element of § 844(i) because it did not have a sufficient nexus 
with interstate commerce.  The Court reasoned that Congress 
intended for the “used in interstate commerce” language of § 
844(i) to require that the object of an arson be used actively, 
rather than passively, in commerce.  Id. at 855-56.  The fact 
that the cousin’s house was fed by natural gas used in 
interstate commerce, was mortgaged with a loan used in 
                                              
5 The Dissent agrees with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Negrette-Rodriguez that Congress did not need to define 
arson generically to achieve a scope broader than the mere 
elements of § 844(i).  This is problematic for two reasons.  
First, this strips the meaning from Congress’s deliberate 
choice to define some aggravated felonies by generic offenses 
and others by federal criminal statutes.  Second, this suggests 
that defining an aggravated felony by a specific federal statute 
is equivalent to defining it with a generic criminal offense — 
such logic contradicts itself. 
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interstate commerce, and was used to obtain a casualty 
insurance policy used in interstate commerce, were not 
sufficiently active uses in commerce.  Id.  A house used as a 
rental property, on the other hand, would be used actively in 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 853 (citing Russell v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 858, 859, 862 (1985)).   
 
The Court surmised that reading the jurisdictional 
element too loosely would render the statute far too broad 
since every building has some indirect connection to 
interstate commerce.  529 U.S. at 859 (“We conclude that § 
844(i) is not soundly read to make virtually every arson in the 
country a federal offense.”); see also Russell, 471 U.S. at 862 
(“In sum, the legislative history [of § 844(i)] suggests that 
Congress at least intended to protect all business property, as 
well as some additional property that might not fit that 
description, but perhaps not every private home.”).  The 
Court did not winnow the reach of § 844(i) because a looser 
interpretation would exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power but, rather, because such an expansive interpretation of 
§ 844(i) would render Congress’s deliberate wording of “used 
in” superfluous and meaningless and would not observe the 
rule of lenity, where criminal statutes are to be read in the 
most lenient fashion available.6  529 U.S. at 857-58. 
 
 The BIA addressed Jones in its decision, largely 
declaring it inapplicable to the collateral immigration 
consequences context.  Bautista, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 620-21.  
                                              
6 However, the Court recognized that its limited reading of § 
844(i) would also avoid the constitutional question addressed 
in United States v. Lopez regarding the regulation of local 
criminal activity.  See Jones, 529 U.S. at 851. 
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The BIA concluded that, in respect to § 101(a)(43)(E), Jones 
established that the jurisdictional element is “an essential 
Federal jurisdictional element” and nothing more because the 
Supreme Court did not extend its holding to collateral 
immigration consequences.  Id.  Here, the BIA’s treatment of 
Jones is in error.  Like Jones, Taylor was not an immigration 
case and did not explicitly extend its holding to collateral 
immigration consequences, yet its categorical approach is 
indisputably binding precedent in immigration cases such as 
this.  495 U.S. at 577-78 (introducing the issue in the case as 
the applicability of a sentencing enhancement for burglary).   
 
 The Dissent swiftly dispatches Jones by discounting it 
as a federalism ruling to prevent Congress from encroaching 
on the power of the states.  The Dissent’s position implies 
that federal criminal statutes should assume different 
meanings depending on the use and context of a statute.  The 
Dissent’s reasoning suggests that, in prosecuting a defendant 
under § 844(i), § 844(i) retains a jurisdictional element but, in 
removing an alien under the INA, the jurisdictional element 
of § 844(i) disappears.  This seems contrary to the reason why 
Congress chose to define some categories of aggravated 
felonies by reference to federal criminal statutes: It is because 
federal criminal statutes have fixed meanings, that they make 
stable and reliable reference points for establishing categories 
of offenses. 
 
 Under Jones, it matters to the categorical approach 
under § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) whether the object of the arson has a 
sufficient nexus with interstate commerce — it does more 
than provide a jurisdictional hook for Congress.  Accordingly, 
a state arson conviction will only be “described in”, and 
punishable under § 844(i), if the state statute includes an 
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element requiring that the object of the arson be actively used 
in interstate commerce.  Thus, Bautista’s conviction is not an 
aggravated felony under the formal categorical approach 
because the New York statute lacks the jurisdictional element 
that Jones held to be a substantive and substantial element of 
§ 844(i).   
 
We cannot undermine the categorical approach and 
Congress’s deliberate choice to include § 844(i), rather than 
generic arson, in § 101(a)(43)(E)(i).  Further, were we to 
ignore the jurisdictional element in our categorical approach 
to § 844(i), as the BIA has here, we would be characterizing a 
state conviction for arson of the intrastate house in Jones as 
an aggravated felony “described in” § 844(i), when the 
Supreme Court clearly excised the arson of such intrastate 
objects from the scope of that federal statute.  We are loath to 
suggest that Congress would use a federal statute, like § 
844(i), to “describe” offenses outside the parameter of that 
very federal statute without an unequivocal indication that it 
was doing something so counterintuitive.  See Lopez v. 
Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 58, 59 (“[I]t would have been passing 
strange for Congress to intend [that federal consequences of 
state crimes would vary by state] when a state criminal 
classification is at odds with a federal provision that the INA 
expressly provides as a specific example of an ‘aggravated 
felony’ [like § 924(c)].”); id. at 54-55 (“Congress can define 
an aggravated felony . . . in an unexpected way.  But 
Congress would need to tell us so, and there are good reasons 
to think it was doing no such thing here.”). 7 
                                              
7 It is also worth mentioning that the penultimate sentence of 
§ 101(a)(43) uses the same “described in” phrasing.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43) (“The term applies to an offense described in 
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On these grounds, we decline to apply our sister 
circuits’ reasoning from the § 922(g)(1) context to the § 
844(i) context.  Specifically, we find that, even if we accept 
our sister circuits’ application of the categorical approach to § 
922(g)(1), that approach cannot survive the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the jurisdictional element of § 844(i) in 
Jones.  In light of Jones and the language of § 
101(a)(43)(E)(i), we can find no principled basis for reading 
the jurisdictional element out of § 844(i).  The bottom line is 
that § 844(i) does not describe generic arson or common law 
arson, but arson that involves interstate commerce.   
 
D.  The Jurisdictional Aspects of the Offenses 
Enumerated in § 101(a)(43) Must Be Considered 
Separately 
 
 We recognize that the salience of a jurisdictional 
element and its requisite interstate commerce nexus may vary 
depending on the substantive nature of the offense at hand.  
As the Supreme Court made clear in Jones, not all arson has a 
nexus with interstate commerce sufficient for it to be 
categorized as a federal offense.  Under § 844(i), the 
jurisdictional element has a meaningful narrowing effect on 
the range of arson criminalized, excluding categories of arson 
that have no more than an insubstantial effect on interstate 
commerce — such as arson involving virtually all private 
residences employed for personal use.  Consequently, by 
                                                                                                     
this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law . . . 
.”) (emphasis added).  Clearly, “described in”, as used in the 
penultimate sentence, means the actual conduct enumerated 
in § 101(a)(43), rather than conduct not directly referenced in 
the subsection. 
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referring to § 844(i) in § 101(a)(43)(E)(i), rather than generic 
arson, Congress deliberately narrowed the range of arson that 
qualifies as an aggravated felony and we must not expand that 
range by ignoring the jurisdictional element in the categorical 
approach. 
 
That this narrows the number of state convictions 
falling under the umbra of § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is of little 
moment to our determination.  See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 
1692-93 (concluding that the dearth of state convictions 
captured under its interpretation of § 101(a)(43)(B) did not 
undermine its interpretation).  But see Nijhawan v. Holder, 
557 U.S. 29, 39-40 (2013) (finding its interpretation of § 
101(a)(43)(M)(i) controlled by the absence of a monetary 
threshold requirement in federal and state fraud statutes).8 
 
We also do not find it persuasive that the Eighth 
Circuit has extended our sister circuits’ § 922(g)(1) rationale 
to the § 1962 racketeering context under § 101(a)(43)(J).  See 
Spacek, 688 F.3d at 538-39.  With respect to the Eighth 
Circuit’s conclusion that all “jurisdictional” provisions may 
be disregarded when applying § 101(a)(43)(J), Jones makes 
                                              
8  Significantly, our holding that a conviction under N.Y. 
Penal Law § 150.10 does not constitute an aggravated felony 
does not mean that Bautista will escape deportation.  “It 
means only avoiding mandatory removal.”  Moncrieffe, 133 
S. Ct. at 1692 (emphasis added).  Bautista has conceded his 
removability for committing a crime involving moral 
turpitude, and now will be eligible to apply for cancellation of 
removal under § 240A of the INA, which is a discretionary 
determination undertaken by the IJ. 
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clear that all elements of the offense described in § 844(i) are 
relevant to the scope of covered state arson offenses under 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i), including those elements that may be 
characterized as “jurisdictional”. 
 
E.  Other Considerations Compel This Result 
 
There are several other reasons why our approach to 
the § 101(a)(43) inquiry is the appropriate one in the context 
of arson convictions.  First, our position is one that remains 
most faithful to the overarching policy of the INA — 
uniformity.  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590-92, 599-600 
(determining that Congress used “uniform, categorical 
definitions to capture all offenses of a certain level of 
seriousness . . . regardless of technical definitions and labels 
under state law”); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (commenting that national uniformity would be 
undermined if “aliens convicted of drug offenses in different 
states that punish similar offenses differently [were] treated 
differently with respect to deportation and cancellation”).  A 
collateral immigration consequence based upon a state 
criminal conviction should not depend on whether and how 
individual states choose to criminalize and codify offensive 
conduct — it should depend on whether the state conviction 
satisfies the elements of the pertinent federal criminal statute 
listed in § 101(a)(43).  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590 (“It seems 
to us to be implausible that Congress intended a [categorical 
definition of a crime] to depend on the definition adopted by 
the State of conviction.”); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 58-
59 (remarking about the “untoward consequences” that would 
ensue if the law of alien removal was “dependent on varying 
state criminal classifications . . . when Congress has 
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apparently pegged the immigration statutes to the 
classifications Congress itself chose”).   
Next, our interpretation of § 101(a)(43) comports best 
with the other federal criminal statutes set out in §101(a)(43).  
A survey of these statutes reveals that the jurisdictional 
elements used in federal criminal statutes are not generic or 
uniform — the jurisdictional element, as an element of the 
crime, may reflect the conduct targeted by the statute or 
reflect the intent of Congress in criminalizing such conduct.  
To provide one example, when § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) refers to an 
“offense described in” 18 U.S.C. § 844(g), it is targeting 
explosives possessed in airports regulated by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (“FAA”) and property controlled by 
the federal government.  Mention of the FAA is not included 
simply to provide a jurisdictional hook such that the 
possession of explosives in any airport should be considered 
an aggravated felony.  Or, to provide another example, when 
§ 101(a)(43)(H) refers to an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 
876, it is specifically targeting threatening communications 
sent through the U.S. Postal Service — that is not merely a 
jurisdictional hook in order to target mail threats generally.  
Or, consider § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii), which refers to an offense 
described in 26 U.S.C. § 7201 — the reference to the federal 
tax code is not merely a jurisdictional hook to target tax 
evasion generally, be it against the federal government or 
state governments.   
 
Congress hand-picked which specific federal criminal 
statutes it would include in § 101(a)(43) and we must give 
due weight to such deliberate choices.  See Lopez v. Gonzales, 
549 U.S. at 58 (“We cannot imagine that Congress took the 
trouble to incorporate its own statutory scheme . . . if it meant 
[for] courts to ignore it whenever a State chose to punish a 
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given act more heavily.”); Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1689 
(calling it an “anomaly” to have courts “ignore the very 
factors” distinguishing the statutes that Congress has 
established to designate aggravated felonies). 
 
It would seem anomalous to disregard the explicit 
requirement that there be a nexus with the FAA, the U.S. 
Postal Service, or federal taxes in those statutes because 
applying that “jurisdictional” element would only capture a 
negligible number of state convictions for possessing 
explosives at airports, sending threatening communications 
through the mail, and evading state taxes.  A threatening 
communication sent intrastate via Fed Ex should not be 
considered an aggravated felony merely because it would 
provide Congress with legislative jurisdiction if it had been 
sent via the U.S. Postal Service. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the formal categorical 
approach requires that convictions under state criminal 
statutes include a jurisdictional element to qualify as 
aggravated felonies corresponding to § 844(i) under § 
101(a)(43)(E)(i). 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will grant 
Bautista’s petition and vacate the BIA’s decision.  We find 
that, since the statute of Bautista’s conviction does not 
contain the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), his 
conviction is not an aggravated felony under § 
101(a)(43)(E)(i) because the state statute of his conviction 
does not require a nexus with interstate commerce.  We 
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remand this case to the BIA for further consideration in 
accord with this opinion.      
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 Mr. Bautista is ineligible for cancellation of removal 
under the INA if he has committed an aggravated felony 
under INA § 101(a)(43)(E)(i).  The BIA held that his 
attempted arson conviction under New York state law is an 
aggravated felony.  In vacating and remanding this ruling, my 
colleagues determine that (1) § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is 
unambiguous; (2) the BIA’s construction of the statute was 
not consistent with Congress’ expressed intent; and (3) 
Bautista’s state arson conviction cannot qualify as an 
aggravated felony because it does not contain as an element 
the jurisdictional requirement of the federal arson provision in 
18 U.S.C. § 844(i).  Because I believe § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) to be 
ambiguous and the BIA’s construction of it reasonable, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. Background 
  Subsection 101(a)(43) of the INA defines an 
aggravated felony, “whether in violation of Federal or State 
law . . . [or] the law of a foreign country,” in one of three 
ways: 1) generically (for example, “murder” or “rape”); 2) as 
an offense “defined in” a specific federal statute; or 3) as an 
offense “described in” a specific federal statute.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43).  Subsection 101(a)(43)(E)(i), the provision 
involved here, is of the third kind: it states that an aggravated 
felony includes any offense “described in” 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).  
The latter criminalizes the (i) damage or destruction, (ii) by 
means of fire or an explosive, (iii) of any building, vehicle, or 
other real or personal property (iv) used in interstate or 
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce.  The last item is what we call a 
jurisdictional hook – the authority to make an act a federal 
crime exists when interstate or foreign commerce is involved.   
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 Bautista was convicted of attempted arson in the third 
degree, in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 150.10 and 
110.  Section 150.10 provides that “[a] person is guilty of 
arson in the third degree when he intentionally damages a 
building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an 
explosion.”  For purposes of the INA, attempting to commit 
arson has the same consequences as committing it.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(U).  Bautista concedes that – apart from the 
jurisdictional element of § 844(i), which requires that the 
target of the arson have a nexus with interstate commerce – 
N.Y. Penal Law § 150.10 and 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) are 
essentially identical.  He argues, however (and the majority 
agrees), that the jurisdictional element of the federal statute is 
a substantive element of the crime, and thus his conviction 
under N.Y. Penal Law § 150.10 is not “an offense described 
in” 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).   
II. Chevron Deference  
 “[T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron deference for 
its interpretations of the immigration laws.”  Tineo v. 
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 396 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  This involves a two-step inquiry.  At step one, we 
determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue and unambiguously expressed [its] 
intent.”  Yusupov v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 518 F.3d 185, 197 
(3d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842-43).  If the answer is yes, the inquiry ends.  Id.  If 
instead “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, [we proceed] to step two [and inquire] whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”  Id. at 198 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  If the statute is ambiguous and the BIA’s 
construction of the statute is reasonable, we are required “to 
accept the [BIA’s] construction of the statute, even if [that] 
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reading differs from what [we believe] is the best statutory 
interpretation.”  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (citation omitted).  
 My colleagues at step one conclude quickly that 
Congress’s intent with respect to the classification of state 
convictions as aggravated felonies under § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is 
clear and that the BIA’s construction of the statute is contrary 
to that intent.  The bulk of their opinion, therefore, explains 
what they believe to be Congress’ expressed intent.  Unlike 
my colleagues, I believe that, under Chevron step one, 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is ambiguous as to when a state arson 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony.  Proceeding to 
the second step, I conclude that the BIA’s construction of 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is reasonable.  Hence we must accept its 
construction regardless whether we believe a different or 
better construction exists.  The consequence is that, because 
the BIA concluded reasonably that Bautista’s state arson 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i), he is ineligible for cancellation of removal 
under the INA.  
A. The Statute is Ambiguous 
 “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.”  Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 
F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).  When interpreting a statute, 
“we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.”  Prestol Espinal v. Attorney Gen. of 
U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States 
v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850)).  While I agree 
with the majority that disagreements in the courts do not 
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automatically mean a statute is ambiguous, those 
disagreements are evidence that reasonable minds may differ 
in interpreting statutory language.  Here I believe that, at best,  
the structure and language of § 101(a)(43)(E) do not 
unambiguously express Congressional intent.         
 The position of my colleagues is, as noted, that the 
language of § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) leaves no doubt and that the 
provision is correctly interpreted in only the following way: if 
a state arson crime would not be directly punishable under 18 
U.S.C. § 844(i) because it lacks the federal statute’s 
jurisdictional element, the state offense does not qualify as an 
aggravated felony.  Their rationale flows as follows.  
“Congress intended some meaning through its use of 
‘described in’ versus ‘defined in.’”  Maj. Op. at 9.  Their take 
is that the latter is broad:  “the state conviction need not be 
punishable under [the relevant] federal statute, but need only 
include the listed criminal conduct, as it is ‘defined’ by the 
federal statute.”  Id.  “[D]escribed in,” they assert, is narrower 
and requires that all elements of the federal criminal statute 
(here § 844(i)) be included within the elements of the state 
criminal provision (N.Y. Penal Law § 150.10).  
 Though “described in” and “defined in” are not 
synonymous, I disagree with my colleagues’ against-the-grain 
suggestion that “defined in” should be read more broadly than 
“described in.”  As our sister Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
concluded, “described in” is the broader standard, and 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)’s use of “described in” favors finding that 
Bautista’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated 
felony.  See United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 
1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Congress as a practical matter . . . had 
to use some looser standard such as ‘described in[,]’ rather 
than the more precise standard of ‘defined in,’ if it wanted 
more than a negligible number of state offenses to count as 
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aggravated felonies.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
 I thus part with my colleagues’ view that Congress 
used the phrase “described in” to classify a state conviction as 
an aggravated felony only when the state offense contains the 
same elements as, and is directly punishable under, a federal 
statute.  To me, the phrase “described in” refers broadly to the 
type of offense.  An offense “described” in § 844(i) includes 
any offense that involves the substantive elements of arson – 
the destruction, by means of fire or an explosive, of a 
building, vehicle, or other real or personal property.  Under 
this reading, the New York state crime of attempted arson 
would fall under the type of offense Congress intended to 
make an aggravated felony even if the New York state statute 
lacks the jurisdictional element of the analogous federal 
statute. 
 The majority asserts that one indication that the 
jurisdictional hook is a substantive element of the federal 
arson statute for purposes of §101(a)(43)(E) is that “Congress 
[, in formulating the provision,] . . . could have defined the 
offenses embodied in the federal statutes by their generic 
names rather than by specific statutes.”  Maj. Op. at 19.  That 
Congress did not fails to persuade me.  Instead, I agree with 
the Seventh Circuit Court’s reasoning in Negrete-Rodriguez 
v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2008).  Responding to the 
same argument in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felon in 
possession of a firearm), the Court there noted: 
[I]t does not follow that, because Congress has 
defined some crimes in general terms, it had to 
define all crimes in general terms in order for 
the offense’s state law counterpart to be 
included within the definition of an “aggravated 
felony.”  Indeed, many firearms offenses are not 
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susceptible to being easily described in general 
terms, while others are dependent on other 
provisions in a statutory scheme. 
Id. at 503 (emphases in original) (citation omitted).  I think 
this argument applies equally in the § 844(i) context.   
  The majority next relies on Jones v. United States, 
529 U.S. 848 (2000), to conclude that the federal 
jurisdictional hook in § 844(i) is a substantive element of the 
offense.  Jones held that the arson of an “owner-occupied 
residence not used for any commercial purpose [did] not 
qualify as property ‘used in’ commerce or commerce-
affecting activity.”  Id. at 850-51.  The Court focused on 
interpreting the jurisdictional component of § 844(i) in order 
to curb Congress’ power vis a vis the states and maintain the 
constitutionality of the federal arson statute.  See id. at 858 
(“To read § 844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owner-
occupied private home would [effectively change the federal-
state balance in the prosecution of crimes], for arson is a 
paradigmatic common-law state crime.”).  Jones ruled that 
the “interstate commerce” language of § 844(i) was 
substantive for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, and 
interpreted that language narrowly in order to prevent 
“[every] building in the land [from falling within] the federal 
statute’s domain.”  Id. at 849.  That ruling, I submit, does not 
support the majority’s position that the jurisdictional 
component of § 844(i) is a substantive element of the 
underlying crime.   
 My colleagues also rely on Jones as evidence that 
Congress intended the jurisdictional element of  § 844(i) to 
narrow the range of arson crimes that qualify as aggravated 
felonies under § 101(a)(43)(E).  Given that Jones postdates 
§ 101(a)(43)(E) by several years, I find this line of reasoning 
unpersuasive.  Instead, I am persuaded by the BIA’s 
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reasoning that “the holding in Jones related to the scope of 
the Federal criminal statute, not the collateral consequences in 
an immigration case.”  Matter of Robert Bautista, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 616, at *5 (Oct. 13, 2011).  
 Were they to adopt the BIA’s reasoning and ignore the 
jurisdictional element of § 844(i), my colleagues contend that 
they “would condone the erroneous outcome” where a state 
conviction for arson could qualify as an aggravated felony for 
purposes of the removal statute despite the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Jones that such a conviction would not hold under 
§ 844(i).  Specifically, they write that  “[w]e are loath to 
suggest that Congress would use a federal statute, like 
§ 844(i), to ‘describe’ offenses outside the parameter of that 
very federal statute without an unequivocal indication that it 
was doing something so counterintuitive.”  Maj. Op. at 23.  
My response is that the penultimate sentence of § 101(a)(43), 
which notes that “the term [aggravated felony] applies to an 
offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of 
Federal or State law,” is precisely such an indication.  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  To qualify as an “aggravated felony” 
for purposes of the INA, an arson offense need not be directly 
punishable under the federal statute.  Instead, as our sister 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have held, the quoted sentence can 
reasonably be read to suggest that Congress intended state 
crimes that are not punishable under any particular federal 
statute still to have collateral immigration consequences 
under the INA.  See, e.g., United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 
244 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 The majority acknowledges that three other Circuit 
Courts of Appeal – the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth – have 
interpreted a parallel provision of the INA, 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(ii), in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
(felon in possession of a firearm), and have held that the 
“interstate commerce” element of the federal statute is simply 
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a jurisdictional requirement distinct from the substantive 
nature of the offense.  See Nieto Hernandez v. Holder, 592 
F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2009); Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 
F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 
244 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 
Court analyzed § 101(a)(43)(J) as it applies to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962 (the RICO statute), and held that a state racketeering 
statute was not required to have the interstate jurisdictional 
element contained in § 1962 in order to be “described” by the 
federal statute for purposes of  § 101(a)(43).  See Spacek v. 
Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2010).  Applying the 
reasoning of these other Circuit Courts to our case, it seems 
logical that the jurisdictional element of § 844(i) need not be 
satisfied in order for a state arson conviction to be an 
aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43).  
 My colleagues diverge from our sister Circuit Courts 
by contending that because not all arson has a nexus with 
interstate commerce sufficient to qualify as a federal offense, 
the jurisdictional element of § 844(i) “has a meaningful 
narrowing effect on the range of arson criminalized,” and so 
must be considered when determining whether an offense 
qualifies as an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(E).  Maj. 
Op. at 25.  They also decline to find the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Spacek persuasive, arguing instead that under 
Jones all statutory elements – including those that are 
“jurisdictional” – are relevant to the scope of state arson 
offenses.   
 Under this reading of the statute, however, it would 
seem that Congress intended state arson convictions rarely, if 
ever, to qualify as aggravated felonies.  My colleagues’ 
position suggests that while murder, rape, theft and firearms 
offenses qualify as aggravated felonies regardless of 
jurisdiction, arson is somehow unique in that it triggers 
collateral immigration consequences only when it has a nexus 
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to interstate commerce.  I do not believe that this result is 
supported by the language of the statute.  See Castillo-Rivera, 
244 F.3d at 1023-24 (“Interpreting the jurisdictional element 
of § 922(g) to be necessary in order for a state firearms 
conviction to constitute an aggravated felony under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) would reduce the number of state 
firearms offenses that qualify to no more than a negligible 
number . . . [and] would undermine the language of the 
aggravated felony statute and the evident intent of 
Congress”).  Thus, I see no principled way to distinguish the 
jurisdictional elements of § 922(g) and § 844(i) in the context 
of interpreting § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) and § 101(a)(43)(E)(ii).   
 Another concern I have is that my colleagues’ reading 
is in tension with the final phrase of § 101(a)(43), which 
provides that an offense in violation of foreign law may also 
be an aggravated felony under the INA.   Congress surely did 
not envision that foreign laws would include references to 
interstate commerce.   
I am also concerned that the majority opinion 
implicitly creates a Circuit split.  In their analysis of § 844(i), 
my colleagues carefully skirt the issue of whether the 
jurisdictional element of § 922(g) is necessary for a state 
firearms conviction to qualify as an aggravated felony, a 
question on which our Court has not ruled.  If and when we 
are asked to decide that question, however, we are likely to 
find ourselves in the untenable position of either abandoning 
the logic of the majority’s opinion or ruling counter to our 
sister Circuit Courts.    
 What I note is not intended to establish that my 
opposing construction of the statute is correct (though I 
believe it is).  The takeaway is that reasonable minds so 
differently interpreting the same language indicates starkly 
that the statute is at best ambiguous.  As such, I continue to 
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the second step of the Chevron inquiry, and consider whether 
the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.  
B. The BIA’s Construction of § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) was 
Reasonable 
 If the BIA has spoken to the meaning of an ambiguous 
statute, the Court’s inquiry is “limited to determining whether 
the BIA’s statutory interpretation is based on a reasonable, 
permissible construction of that statute.”  Tineo, 350 F.3d at 
396.  In our case, the BIA has spoken on the meaning of 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) and has expressly held that, because the 
jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) does not define 
the substantive offense, the New York state law offense of 
attempted arson is a crime “described in” § 844(i) and thus 
qualifies as an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.  In 
its statutory analysis of § 101(a)(43)(E)(i), the BIA addressed 
several of the points that I have raised above, notably the 
difficulty of distinguishing the jurisdictional elements of 
§ 844(i) and § 922(g)(1) and the limited application of Jones.   
*    *    *    *    * 
 Given the BIA’s thorough analysis, as well as the 
persuasive authority from our Circuit colleagues interpreting 
a related pairing of immigration and federal criminal 
provisions, I conclude that the BIA’s interpretation of 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) as it relates to § 844(i) is reasonable under 
Chevron.  I would affirm the BIA’s ruling that Bautista’s 
arson conviction under New York state law qualifies as an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  The 
regrettable result is that Bautista is ineligible for cancellation 
of removal.  I thus respectfully dissent.  
